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Have the early coordination failures models achieved Keynes’s programme?




The aim of this paper is to assess how three seminal coordination failure models (Diamond
([1982] 1991), Howitt (1985) and Roberts (1987)) have fared against ‘Keynes’s programme’.
The first part of the paper characterises Keynes’s programme as consisting of the following
four  objectives:  (a)  demonstrating  the  existence  of  involuntary  unemployment,  (b)
demonstrating that wage rigidity can be exonerated as its cause, (c) giving a general
equilibrium interdependency explanation of the phenomenon within a perfect competition
framework, and (d) demonstrating that demand stimulation is the proper remedy to suppress
involuntary unemployment. In a second part, I claim that no correct assessment of Keynes’s
programme can be made without drawing a distinction between involuntary unemployment
and underemployment. These prerequisites being settled, in part three I undertake the study of
the three models to conclude that none of them succeed in achieving Keynes’ programme in
its entirety. In the last part of the paper, I raise the issue as to whether Keynesian economists
should continue to fight for the involuntary unemployment concept.
Résumé
L’objectif de cet article est d’évaluer la mesure dans laquelle trois modèles pionniers de la
théorie des échecs de coordination (Diamond ([1982] 1991), Howitt (1985) et Roberts (1987))
ont réussi à réaliser le projet poursuivi par Keynes dans la Théorie générale. Celui-ci est
décrit  dans  une  première  partie  de  l’article  comme  consistant  en  quatre  objectifs:  (a)
démontrer l’existence du chômage involontaire; (b) exonérer la possibilité qu’il soit causé par
un salaire trop élevé; en donner une explication d’équilibre général dans un contexte de
concurrence parfaite; (d) démontrer que le remède à appliquer est une stimulation de la
demande agrégée. Dans une second partie, je souligne la nécessité de séparer les cas de
chômage involontaire et de sous-emploi. La troisième partie de l’article est consacrée à
l’examen des modèles. La conclusion qui y tirée est que, pour des raisons différentes, aucun
des trois modèles ne réussit à pleinement réaliser le programme de Keynes. Enfin, dans le
dernière partie, je m’interroge sur la question de savoir si les économistes keynésiens doivent
continuer à se battre pour défendre le concept de chômage involontaire.
KEYWORDS: involuntary unemployment, coordination failures, Keynes.
JEL: B 220, E 120, E 200
                                                   
◊ IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, 3 Place Montesquieu, 1348 Louvain-la-neuve, Belgium. E-mail
address: devroey@ires.ucl.ac.be
This work was supported by the Belgian French-speaking Community (Grant ARC 03/08-302) and the Belgian
Federal  Government  (Grant  PAI  P5/10).   Ludovic  Julien’s  comments  on  an  earlier  draft  are  gratefully
acknowledged.1
1. Introduction
Coordination failures models are often branded as ‘Keynesian’. This should come as no
surprise because nobody would deny that by trying to bring out cases of malfunctioning of the
market system these models’ creators were treading in Keynes’s footsteps. My aim in this
paper is to delve deeper into the issue of the Keynesian character of the coordination failures
literature.
  1  More precisely, I want to assess the contribution of a few of its early models
against the background of what I shall call ‘Keynes’s programme’, the result of my attempt to
identify more precisely the aim that Keynes was pursuing when writing his General Theory
(1936). The following three models will be examined: Diamond ([1982] 1991), Howitt (1985)
and Roberts (1987).
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2. Keynes’s programme: a reconstruction
Hosts of books and articles have been written purporting to delineate the theoretical objective
that Keynes set himself when writing the General  Theory.  Unfortunately, none of the
proposed interpretations has gained unanimous acceptance, a point to which I shall have the
opportunity to return in my conclusion. Nonetheless a standpoint must be taken. Mine is as
follows.
First of all, Keynes pursued the objective of demonstrating the theoretical existence of
involuntary unemployment. The latter, he recognised, was a phenomenon whose real-world
existence was compelling yet for which economic theory could find no place. Bridging this
gulf was the task he set himself.
Keynes’  interest  in  involuntary  unemployment  followed  from  the  presumption  that  it
expressed some system failure, a malfunctioning of the decentralised economy.
3 Its existence
had to temper, if not upset, the optimistic interpretation of this system put forward by many
economists since Adam Smith. In particular, Keynes wanted to link it with a deficiency in
aggregate demand for the output as a whole, itself associated with some leakage from the
productive towards the financial sector.
                                                   
1 This paper borrows from chapter 2, 5, 18 and 20 of De Vroey (2004).
2 Cooper and John (1988) is probably the best-known paper on coordination failures. It shows how an apparently
disparate stream of literature can be unified by pointing out its two common traits, the existence of spillovers and
strategic complementary. However, it will not be discussed here, because it gives no central role to the notion of
involuntary unemployment. Other interesting early coordination failure articles are Bryant (1983), Drazen
(1987), Heller (1986)  and Weitzman (1982).
3 In Leijonhufvud’s terms ‘Keynes was concerned with a systemic problem that could be defined neither in terms
of individual decision situations nor in terms of interactions between buyers and sellers in a single market’
(Leijonhufvud, 1983: 195-196). Or, as Coddington put it: ‘Involuntary unemployment arises because of a
malfunctioning of the economic system: it is not that individuals lack the willingness or ability to work but rather
that the economy is failing to provide them with the opportunity to do so’ (Coddington 1983: 27). See also
Kregel (1987: 135).2
The claim that involuntary unemployment follows from some system failure affects the type
of  analysis  to  be  undertaken.  The  common  explanation  in  Keynes’s  time  was  that
unemployment was the result of wage levels being too high. Such an explanation is part of a
Marshallian analysis in which one market, here the labour market, is considered in isolation
from the rest of the economy. Keynes wished to escape this framework in a twofold way. On
the one hand, he wanted to discharge too high a wage from any responsibility for the
existence of involuntary unemployment. On the other, the explanation for involuntary
unemployment had to be located outside the labour market. As Meltzer put it: ‘the problem is
manifested in the labour market, but it does not arise in the labour market’ (1988:197).
  What
Keynes was actually striving for was to move the analysis of unemployment from a partial to
a general equilibrium framework (although this terminology did not exist at this time). Yet,
such a willingness to adopt an interdependency perspective should not be interpreted as an
adhesion to the Walrasian general equilibrium approach. In Keynes’s time, Walras’s views
were hardly known in Cambridge and, for better or worse, Keynes did not think that Walras’s
theory could be of any help to his own project.
On the other hand, Keynes did not want to join the imperfect competition line of argument
which was emerging at the time in Cambridge. He wanted to put his argument in terms of
perfect competition – possibly because he associated imperfect competition with collusion,
unions, etc, whereas he wanted to bring to the fore some deeper systemic feature.
As far as policy was concerned. Keynes believed that a remedy existed for the flaw in the
economic system that he had striven to display, and that it was not lowering wages. To him
the government certainly had an active role to play, yet this insight received no precise
content in the General Theory. For all Keynes’s evasiveness on this matter, the interpretation,
which quickly became popular, that the appropriate remedy was state-induced demand
stimulation, seems appropriate. The rationale for this view is that demand activation follows
from the diagnosis that Keynes posited, namely that involuntary unemployment resulted from
aggregate demand deficiency. The latter implies demand activation as its remedy!
The  above  analysis  can  be  summarised  by  stating  that  Keynes’s  research  programme
consisted of four items:
1) demonstrating the existence of involuntary unemployment;
2) demonstrating that wage rigidity can be exonerated as its cause;
3) giving a general equilibrium or interdependency explanation of the phenomenon within a
perfect competition framework;
4) demonstrating that that demand stimulation is the proper remedy to solve the problem of
involuntary unemployment.3
Finally, I surmise that in Keynes’s eyes this theoretical enterprise had to be achieved whilst
sticking as closely as possible to the premises of standard theory. For sure, the latter had to be
modified in order to integrate involuntary unemployment, yet this had to occur with minimum
changes in premises, in short, in a ‘methodologically correct way’.
In view of the various ambiguities that are present in the General Theory, I cannot claim that
my reconstruction of Keynes’s aim is the only conceivable one. Nonetheless, I hope that it
constitutes a plausible account. It would require no further explanation were it not for the first
item, that of demonstrating the existence of involuntary unemployment, which requires a
special investigation.
3. Defining involuntary unemployment and differentiating it from underemployment
According  to  standard  microeconomic  theory,  the  fact  that  an  economic  agent  is  not
participating in the labour market is not incongruous. It must simply be the case that the
prevailing wage is lower than or equal to his or her reservation wage (i.e. the highest value of
the real wage such that the demand for leisure is equal to the total time endowment of the
agent concerned). Call this the ‘reservation wage principle’. The existence of involuntary
unemployment can then be seen as a violation of this principle. It occurs if agents are not
trading despite the fact that the market wage exceeds their reservation wage. According to the
first order condition of their decision problem  the equalisation of the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure with the real wage rate  they should be
participating yet they are not. Nonetheless trading, instead of an adjustment in the wage rate,
is occurring. Put differently, at the real wage/employment mix characterising effective
trading, some suppliers are ‘off their supply curve’ and rationed. Market non-clearing and the
breaching of the reservation wage principle are thus two faces of the same coin.
This definition can be traced back to Chapter 2 of the General Theory, where it is pinpointed
by Keynes as a violation of the second classical postulate. Reflecting further on it, I shall
now argue that it amounts to describing somebody who is involuntarily unemployed as being
in a state of individual disequilibrium. To this end, following authors such as Hayek ([1937]
1948) and Patinkin (1965: 11-12, 387-392), the standard notion of optimising behaviour
needs to be qualified by driving a wedge between the optimal plan and optimising behaviour.
The optimal plan refers to agents’ solutions to the choice problem they are facing. It is
formed before the opening of trading. As stated by Patinkin:
We  can  consider  the  individual  –  with  his  given  indifference  map  and  initial
endowment – to be a ‘utility-computer’ into whom we ‘feed’ a sequence of market
prices and from whom we obtain a corresponding sequence of ‘solutions’ in the form
of specified optimum positions. (Patinkin 1965: 7)4
Agents’ optimal plans become expressed in their individual supply or demand (or excess
demand) schedules. In contrast, optimising behaviour refers to what is observed after trading
has started. Thus, optimising behaviour implies that the optimal plan has come through. My
point is that optimal choice and optimising behaviour need to be logically separated – finding
a solution to a choice problem and implementing it are not one and the same thing.
Individual equilibrium exists whenever the action of a given agent during a given trade round
turns out to be the execution of his or her individual optimising plan as decided at the
beginning of the trade round. Individual disequilibrium refers to a case where this is untrue.
Individual disequilibrium thus means the inability of some agents to transform their optimal
plan into optimising behaviour.
What is usually understood by equilibrium is actually an interactive equilibrium, i.e. a state
where optimal plans have been made compatible. Thus, interactive equilibrium implies
generalised individual equilibrium. In Hayek’s terms:
Equilibrium in this connection exists if the actions of all members of society over a
period are all executions of their respective individual plans on which each decided at
the beginning of the period (Hayek [1937] 1948: 37)
Symmetrically, the notion of interactive disequilibrium refers to a state of incompatibility
across individual plans. Its counter-part at the individual level is that at least some agents are
in a state of individual disequilibrium.
In this light, it turns out that involuntary unemployment is a case of individual disequilibrium.
It ought to be understood as ‘forced leisure’, opposed to ‘chosen leisure’. The unemployed,
the argument runs, are deprived of the capacity normally attached to every economic agent to
participate in the interactive process through which market outcomes are generated. Excluded
from the opportunity to work, they are cast aside by the market system through no fault of
their own. Therefore, the ‘involuntary’ modifier seems perfectly appropriate.
The breaching the reservation wage principle definition has the merit of bringing out the fact
that unemployment is a phenomenon of disparity, marked by a split between the employed
and the unemployed. It exists when total employment is unevenly distributed across agents, as
it affects a proportion of the active population  the unemployed  while leaving the
employed agents unaffected.
Unfortunately, constructing models able to demonstrate involuntary unemployment as defined
above has proved to be a most daunting task, except of course if the assumption of an
exogenous wage floor is made. In my recent book , Involuntary Unemployment. The Elusive
Quest for a Theory (De Vroey 2004), I argue that, claims to the contrary notwithstanding,
neither Keynes nor IS-LM authors were able to give a solid justification of involuntary
unemployment in the breaching of the reservation wage sense and, a fortiori, as a case of5
individual disequilibrium. True, models yielding involuntary unemployment in the breaching
sense emerged in the 1970s and 1980s  I am thinking of implicit contract and efficiency
wage  models.  However,  they  forewent  the  individual  disequilibrium  aim  by  giving
involuntary unemployment the milder meaning of a state where the unemployed are frustrated
and jealous of the employed, a state which coexists with optimal behaviour (and thus with
individual equilibrium).
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My claim that no models demonstrating the breaching of the reservation wage principle
surfaced before the mid-1970s prompts the further question of why it was believed for so long
that involuntary unemployment had been demonstrated. This is due, I now want to claim, to a
semantic confusion between two concepts, involuntary unemployment and underemployment.
The problem is that the notion of involuntary unemployment has been understood as meaning
something other than the breaching of the reservation wage principle meaning (which is its
appropriate definition in my eyes). In particular, it has been used to designate states of
underemployment where no such a breaching occurs.
5 These are cases where the employment
level endogenously reached by the economy is deemed to be inferior in welfare or efficiency
terms with respect to some higher level, attainable only through exogenous action. That is,
amongst the conceivable employment levels, that which endogenously prevails is not that
which allows the most utility to agents. To every agent, it is optimal in the sense that it results
from  constrained  optimising  decision-making.  Thus,  the  reservation  wage  principle  is
satisfied, and supply of and demand for labour match. Nonetheless, a higher utility would be
reached if a greater employment level could be arrived at. The wedge between the optimal
and the effective level of employment is then called involuntary unemployment. Here, the
involuntary modifier makes sense only in a loose way as referring to some inability to achieve
a welfare-dominating higher level of employment.
Involuntary unemployment in the underemployment sense captures an idea that must certainly
have been attractive to Keynes and is still so to Keynesian economists: that underemployment
ought to be related to a systemic flaw associated with the decentralised nature of the decision-
making process in capitalist economies, rather than to wage rigidity or too high wages,
However, it suffers from two drawbacks. First, two types of underemployment, ‘dominated
underemployment’, on the one hand, and ‘efficient underemployment’, on the other, should
be distinguished. The former pertains to cases where the existing level of employment is both
non-maximal and sub-optimal  it is welfare-dominated by one or several higher level. The
latter designates cases where the existing level of employment is non-maximal yet optimal 
reaching a higher level of employment would not increase agents’ utility. Clearly, only states
                                                   
4 As stated by Azariadis, ‘the employed workers… are to be envied by their laid-off colleagues – a situation that
many economists would call ‘involuntary unemployment’ (1987: 734).
5 The author who initiated this understanding of involuntary unemployment is probably Haavelmo (1950).6
of dominated underemployment can be of interest to economists wanting to denounce some
market failure. However, it has turned out that models which claim to have demonstrated
underemployment in the dominated sense, have actually succeeded only in demonstrating it in
the efficient sense. The most striking examples of this are models based on the inverse L-
shaped supply of labour curve.
The second drawback of the underemployment line of research it that it is low-key. Models
demonstrating involuntary unemployment in this sense fail to come to grips with the unequal
distribution  of  total  employment  across  agents,  deemed  to  be  a  central  feature  of
unemployment. In these models, every agent wanting to participate in the labour market does
so in an optimising way  no individual disequilibrium is present. It is just that their
participation could be increased through exogenous actions. So what is called involuntary
unemployment has nothing to do with joblessness  i.e. people who are totally out of work
 although the initial motivation for the research was to give a theoretical account of this
phenomenon. In short, we have an alleged theory of involuntary unemployment from which
unemployment, strictly understood, is absent. Therefore the underemployment definition of
involuntary unemployment is wanting.
To conclude, two main definitions of involuntary unemployment are available: a narrow one
where involuntary unemployment designates a breach of the reservation wage principle and a
broader one where it refers to underemployment. A relativistic stance could be taken
according to which both definitions would be considered acceptable. However, this is not the
stance I wish to take. I rather think that the first definition is the most apposite, and that this is
the definition that Keynes had in mind. To compound the matter, there are two sub-types of
involuntary unemployment in the breaching of the reservation wage sense: the former bears
the individual disequilibrium connotation, the second does not.   Here again, it must be
presumed that Keynes had in mind the first variant. If this viewpoint is accepted, models
demonstrating involuntary unemployment in any sense other than individual disequilibrium
cannot be considered as having fulfilled the first item of Keynes’s programme.
At the time he wrote the General  Theory, it was hardly perceived that the involuntary
unemployment concept, so understood, was on a collision course with what we now call
‘microfoundations’. Moreover, in the wake of the Great Depression it would have been out of
place  to  question  the  view  that  the  unemployed  were  in  this  condition  involuntarily.
Nowadays, however things have changed drastically, the burden of the proof having shifted
onto those who want to use the involuntary unemployment concept rather than onto its
opponents.7
4. A critical examination of the early coordination failures models
4.1. Diamond’s search equilibrium model
Diamond’s model pertains to a perfectly competitive barter economy:
It is common in theoretical economics to use a tropical island metaphor to describe the
working of a model. The island described here has many individuals, not one. When
employed, they stroll along the beach examining palm trees. Some trees have coconuts.
All bunches have the same number of nuts but differ in the height above the ground.
Having spotted a bunch, the individual decides whether to climb the tree. There is a
taboo against eating nuts one has picked oneself. Having climbed a tree, the worker
goes searching for a trade – nuts for nuts – which will result in consumption (Diamond
[1982] 1991: 42).
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The economy comprises only self-employed agents. They fall into two classes. Either they are
searching for a productive activity, i.e. for a tree that is worth climbing, or they are looking
for a trading partner after having found a suitable tree. Agents of the former type are called
the ‘unemployed’, those of the second the ‘employed’ ([1982] 1991: 33). Every tree bears the
same number of coconuts yet trees vary in terms of the effort needed to reach and pick the
nuts. The arrival of production possibilities is stochastic. The effort must be below some
threshold pertaining to the individual’s willingness to act on production opportunities (the cut-
off cost c*). Once agents are endowed with coconuts, they must find somebody else, also in
possession of coconuts, with whom to make a swap.
7 This is the second searching process.
When it is over, trade takes place on a one-for-one basis, and the good is consumed.
Diamond’s central assumption is that the arrival rate of trading partners is an increasing
function of the level of activity, i.e. the number of agents holding coconuts to trade. Thus,
trade technology exhibits increasing returns to scale: an increase in the level of activity makes
trading easier.
The time derivative of the employment rate satisfies:
€ 
˙  e  = a(1- e) G(c*) – eb(e)
where  e is the level of activity, a the arrival rate of production possibilities, (1− e) the
unemployment rate, G the distribution of costs and b the arrival rate of trading partners. The
first element of the right-hand expression is the rate of inflow in tradable goods, the second
the rate of outflow, i.e. the decrease in the stock of inventories.
                                                   
6 In my eyes, the third sentence of Diamond’s quotation should read ‘when unemployed‘ in view of what he
writes on p. 33, ‘Individuals have 0 or y units for sale. The former are looking for production opportunities and
are referred to as unemployed’.
7 On top of the assumption that agents cannot consume the products of their own investment of labour, it is also
assumed that they cannot undertake further production before having exchanged the coconuts they hold.8
As illustrated in Figure 1, the steady-state employment rate, 
€ 
˙  e  = 0, is an upward sloping
function of b, ‘since a greater willingness to invest goes with a greater number of traders if the
flows into and out of inventories are to match‘ (Diamond 1984: 11). It starts from a positive
lower bound of possible production costs, c, and is bounded above by the employment level
reached if all possible production opportunities are accepted.
Next, Diamond considers the determination of c*, the cut-off cost, the individual willingness
to act on production opportunities.. Individuals, who are assumed to know a and b, choose c*
to maximise their expected lifetime utility. The underlying assumption is that the optimal cut-
off cost (c*) is equal to the capital gain from a change in position from holding a good in
inventory to not holding. c* is a positive concave function of e, starting from the origin.
Figure 1 Underemployment in Diamond’s search model
As Figure 1 shows, Diamond’s model features multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria. After a
shock, the economy can get stuck in a ‘wrong’ steady state equilibrium, even if the shock has
passed. The way is thus paved for exogenous interventions.
With multiple equilibria there is an important potential role for government. The
government can attempt to influence beliefs by suggesting that there is nothing to fear
but fear itself. More important, the government can take fiscal action to increase9
aggregate demand and so launch the economy on the optimistic path. In this way we can
model pump-priming while being completely consistent with individual maximisation
and rational expectations (Diamond, 1984: 26).
Assessing Diamond’s model, the first remark to be made is that he uses the terms ‘employed’
and ‘unemployed’ terms in a particular way. To him, somebody is unemployed whenever he
or she is searching for a production opportunity, but employed when searching for a trading
opportunity. According to the standard, and in my opinion better, definition, an agent is
unemployed if he or she is unsuccessfully attempting to participate in the labour market.
Although there is of course something in common between the self-employed person who
happens to be without clients and the jobless person, I believe that they should be considered
as  engaging  in  distinct  types  of  activities.  Thus,  a  prerequisite  for  the  existence  of
unemployment is that the economy under study comprises a labour market. Since this is not
the  case  in  Diamonds’  model,  strictly  speaking,  it  has  no  place  for  the  category  of
unemployment, and a fortiori for that of involuntary unemployment. His model must thus be
characterised as pertaining to dominated underemployment.
Hence, the first point of Keynes’ programme is not achieved. However, Diamond’s model
fares better on the other points. It exhibits a system failure to combat for which demand
activation is the proper policy. Finally, rigidity is discharged from any responsibility for the
underemployment phenomenon.
4.2. Howitt’s transaction costs model
Howitt has been keener than other authors to draw a connection between modern models and
Keynes’s own conceptions. One of his strong beliefs about the Keynesian programme is that
fixed prices have no place in it. Keynesian economists, he argues, ought to be criticised for
their failure to follow this principle.
Keynes was a great success in many respects. But in his main objective, that of freeing
the theoretical explanation of unemployment from depending upon sticky wages and
prices, he was a failure. The Keynesian revolution soon settled on the conclusion that
Keynes’s system made sense, and resulted in unemployment, only under the assumption
of a sticky money wage rate (Howitt 1990: 7).
8
Since  Keynes  himself  proved  unable  to  dispense  with  wage  rigidity,  any  theoretical
development that might succeed in this enterprise will be highly appreciated. According to
                                                   
8 In the same vein, Howitt notes that ‘from Modigliani to Taylor the modern Keynesian position has been the
classical one that Keynes was attacking: that sticky wages are to blame’ (1990: 75). However, his review of
Bewley’s 1999 book (Howitt 2001), gives the impression that he may have changed his mind.10
Howitt, getting rid of the standard claim ‘that people are unemployed because they are asking
too much’ is the main contribution of coordination failures models.
Howitt’s model (1985) has a twofold lineage  first, the disequilibrium tradition and, second,
Diamond’s model. From the former, Howitt retains the presence of quantity signals, while
abandoning its fixprice feature. From Diamond, he borrows the trade externality idea.
The auctioneer is present in Howitt’s model, yet he exerts only his price announcing function
without arranging trade. Agents have to find traders in a costly way (i.e. they must use
resources in order to execute transactions). Firms have to use up a fraction of production to
this end, households a fraction of their time. The thrust of Howitt’s model is that the unit cost
of selling decreases with the quantity traded. Hence the ‘thin-market externality’: the thinner
the market, the higher the transaction cost, and vice-versa.
9 The existence of these costs
changes agents’ decision-making processes, as they need to be alert to quantity signals.
Hence, the demand for labour is a function not only of the real wage, but also of the quantity
of labour traded, the same being true for labour supply.
To Howitt, labour trading costs is a sort of unproductive labour, to use classical economists’
parlance. This unproductive labour is ‘unemployment’.
I shall interpret unemployment as labour services used up in the selling of labour
services. … The rate of unemployment is the fraction of all labour services used in
selling labour (Howitt 1985: 93).
The eventual effect of such transaction costs is that the equilibrium will not generally be
unique as Figure 2 below, reproduced from Howitt (1985: 95), illustrates.
                                                   
9 The unitary sale effort per firm (σ ) is a function of total output (y ), while the unitary sale effort per  worker
(τ ) is a function of total labour traded (n ) with σ ‘(y ) < 0 and τ ‘(n ) < 0.11
Figure 2 Underemployment in Howitt’s model
The welfare implication of multiple equilibria is that households’ utility will be greater
whenever employment is greater. This result, Howitt claims, must be interpreted as a case of
involuntary unemployment, the latter being equal to the fraction of labour services used up in
the selling of labour services.
In  discussing  Diamond’s  model,  I  have  argued  that  it  cannot  be  considered  to  have
unemployment as  its  proper  object because it comprises no  labour  market. The same
observation must be made about Howitt’s model although the labour market is present in it.
What Howitt calls unemployment does not fit what I consider its proper definition. In his
model, there is market clearing, everybody who wants to work is working, and the loss in
employment is evenly distributed across agents. Thus, its real object of analysis is dominated
underemployment. Since unemployment is absent, the ‘involuntary’ modifier is disqualified
as well.
Like Diamond, Howitt is on firmer ground as concerns the other elements of Keynes’s
programme. First, his result belongs to the system failure type: any demand boost will result
in decreasing the unit transaction cost, hence improving agents’ welfare. Moreover, no
objection can be levelled to Howitt’s claim that price rigidity plays no role in his model.12
4.3. Roberts’ coordination failures model
Authors such as Clower, Leijonhufvud and Benassy had realised that the trade organisation
assumption ( i.e. the auctioneer hypothesis) constituted the decisive obstacle against the
introduction of market rationing in Walrasian or neo-Walrasian theory. The difficulty,
however, was to find a tractable way of disposing with the auctioneer. Roberts’ (1987) model
marks an important step in this direction.
According  to  Roberts,  his  model  formally  captures  Clower’s  idea  of  self-confirming
conjectures. He also claims to be heir to authors such as Barro-Grossman, Drèze and Benassy
in emphasising perceived quantity constraints as well as the idea that demand constrains
employment. Yet the fixed-price assumption is disposed with.
The following quotations brings home the gist of Roberts’ model:
Equilibrium with full employment exists, with all agents transacting their Walrasian
quantities. Simultaneously there are also equilibria at the these same prices and wages in
which markets fail to clear. In particular, some price-taking and wage-taking workers
are rationed in their labour market transactions and are unable to sell as much of their
labour as they desire at the given wage. This involuntary unemployment arises despite
the model’s incorporating markets for all commodities.… and in equilibrium no such
agent finds it worthwhile, for example, to reduce wages in the face of involuntary
unemployment. (Roberts 1987: 856)
Roberts’ claim is stronger than Howitt’s since he is unambiguously striving to demonstrate
involuntary unemployment in its reservation wage definition where ‘workers facing given
prices and wages are off their supply curves in equilibrium’ (Roberts 1987: 858). The
possibility of such a result stems from the radically non-Walrasian trade technology adopted:
‘the key is in the modelling of the processes determining prices and individual transactions’
(1987: 856). Roberts assumes a separation and specialisation in production and consumption.
There are two types of producers (A and B), two types of worker-consumers (J and K), two
types of labour (r and s) and two flows of goods (x and y). In total the economy comprises
five commodities, money (m), which is non-produced, being the fifth. The model is based on
a generalised absence of a ‘Ford effect’. No worker can supply inputs to a producer from
whom he or she might buy outputs. Symmetrically, workers buy output only from the type of
producer to whom they supply no labour. As shown in Figure 3, the Js can supply input only
to As while they can purchase output only from Bs.13
Figure.3. The trade structure in Roberts' model
All agents are endowed with money. Only producers have the technical knowledge to produce
goods.  Labour  is  the  only  factor  of  production.  Returns  to  scale  are  constant.  The
input−output coefficient is set at unity. Production is made to order. No inventories are
present. Prices and wages are flexible, in that all producers may set the price and wage they
control at any level they wish.
The formation of equilibrium prices and quantities occurs in three stages. In stage 1, firms
announce prices. In stage 2, workers react by making trade proposals, pertaining to both
labour and the produced good, to the different firms. In stage 3, firms make their quantity
decisions by selecting quantities of labour and quantities of the produced good to be sold from
the workers’ offers to trade.
The economy and institutions together define a game in extensive form. Examining its sub-
game perfect equilibria, Roberts shows that a continuity of equilibria is possible. Walrasian
equilibrium is one of them. Another possible equilibrium is when agents do not trade at all.
Keynesian equilibria can also exist, where some of the consumers trade their Walrasian
quantities at the Walrasian price and wage while a subset of consumers consume their initial







Such a result follows from the non-cooperative character of the game coupled with its
institutional arrangement, on the one hand, and with the presence of the non-produced good,
on the other. Involuntary unemployment will result from households of one type developing
self-fulfilling pessimistic conjectures about the quantity choices made by households of the
other type.
Such pessimistic conjectures arise, for example, when a K-consumer, whose optimising plan
is to sell labour and purchase output, conjectures that the corresponding J-agent has decided to
consume his or her endowment and make a zero labour and output offer. Agent J makes the
same conjecture about agent K. As a result, neither of them will supply labour and demand
output, contrary to their optimising plan. In this case, the state of involuntary unemployment
of some agents results from their conjectures as to other agents making the voluntary
unemployment choice (i.e. the decision to use the total time endowment for leisure). Another
example is when a K-household, whose optimising plan is to trade s and x, conjectures that the
corresponding agent J will choose to supply r while expressing no demand for y. If agent K
further conjectures that Firm B, to whom he or she was intending to sell labour, will end up
refusing the offer for lack of demand for y while in contrast firm A, from which he or she was
intending to buy x, will accept the trade offer. Realising that this situation might result in
negative money holdings, agent K will refrain from trading (Roberts 1987: 868).
Roberts’ model must be hailed for having demonstrated involuntary unemployment in the
reservation wage sense. Does it also feature individual disequilibrium? Roberts’ own answer
seems to be negative. He wants his agents to exhibit optimality and rationality, two features
which he considers equivalent to their being in equilibrium. It then seems unwarranted to refer
to  individual  disequilibrium.  However,  Roberts’  definitional  stance  rests  on  equating
optimality, rationality and equilibrium. As a result, individual equilibrium is axiomatic. My
viewpoint is different. As stated above, I believe that a distinction must be drawn between
individual planning and effective or observable behaviour  it is not because an agent has
rationally conceived an optimal plan that the latter will necessary be realised. Roberts’ model
shows exactly this. My definition of individual disequilibrium refers precisely to the case
where an agent is unable to make his or  her optimal plan come through. Thus, individual
disequilibrium excludes neither rationality nor optimising planning. If my distinction and
definition are accepted, Roberts’ rational agents can be considered as being in a state of
individual disequilibrium since they are stuck in forced leisure through no fault of their own.
Finally, let me turn to the other features of the Keynesian programme. The framework
adopted by Roberts is general equilibrium. Involuntary unemployment co-exists with the
Walrasian wage, so that wage rigidity cannot be declared guilty of causing involuntary
unemployment.  Unfortunately  Roberts’  paper  misses  the  full  realisation  of  Keynes’
programme, for it fails to properly tackle the policy dimension.15
4.4. Comparing the three models
Table 1 summarises the results of my investigation into how the three models fare with
respect to the Keynesian programme.
Table 1. The realisation of Keynes’s programme
Diamond Howitt  Roberts
Involuntary unemployment in the   no no yes
individual disequilibrium sense
System failure yes yes yes
Price and wage flexibility yes yes yes
Demand activation as the
proper remedial policy yes yes no
Two main conclusions stand out. First, all three models come close to achieving Keynes’
programme,  yet  none  of  them  fully  succeeds  in  this  endeavour.  The  shortcomings  of
Diamond’s and Howitt’s model are to bear on underemployment rather than involuntary
unemployment. They are unable to grasp the uneven distribution of employment across agents
that characterises unemployment. The individual disequilibrium connotation is also absent.
Howitt’s insistence on involuntary unemployment is more a source of conceptual confusion
than of assistance. As to Roberts, he succeeds in demonstrating involuntary unemployment in
its individual disequilibrium meaning. His model confirms my intuition that a main stumbling
block to theorising involuntary unemployment lies in the trade technology on which canonical
economic theory rests. Yet he fails on the score of justifying demand activation.
My second, conclusion bears on the comparison between the three models. Up to now I seem
to have privileged the aim of demonstrating involuntary unemployment.  As a result, Roberts’
model seems   to be superior to Diamond’s and Howitt’s. Does this mean that Keynesian
economists should follow Roberts’ lead rather than Diamond’s or Howitt’s? This is not
necessarily true. Definitely, Roberts’ model marks a victory on the front of demonstrating
involuntary unemployment. But then, it turns out to be a one-shot victory  yes involuntary
unemployment has been demonstrated, but so what? On the one hand, Roberts just provides
an example of involuntary unemployment. No research programme ensues, On the other hand,
the victory comes too late, at a time when the agenda of macroeconomics has already shifted16
away from the battle over involuntary unemployment, as a result of the ‘new’ classical
revolution.
5. A broader perspective
My conclusion as to the incapacity of coordination failures models to fully take up Keynes’s
programme also holds for other so-called New Keynesian models such as efficiency wage or,
imperfect competition models. It is always the same picture. At best, these models succeed in
achieving all but one of the four items on Keynes’ programme. None achieves the full success
score.
How should this continuing failure be interpreted? My opinion is that, seven decades after the
publication of the General Theory, the most plausible explanation is that Keynes’ programme
is non-feasible; at least one of its elements is always too much.
Had Keynesian authors cast their standpoint in reference to Keynes’s programme as I have
defined it, they could have stated that their departure from this agenda stemmed from a
realisation of its impossibility, and from the need to replace it by a more tractable programme.
If this viewpoint is accepted, my analysis resolves two standard enigmas in the history of
Keynesian economics. The first is why Keynesian theories have emerged which depart from
Keynes’s own way of putting issue. This happened, it can now be asserted, because Keynes’s
programme was not feasible. The second conundrum is why, if Keynes’s programme had to
be amended, has it not been replaced by a single alternative programme, to which all
Keynesian economists could rally? Why, in other words, are there competing Keynesian
theories? Here again, the answer is simple. Once it is admitted that some departure from
Keynes’s programme is necessary, several alternatives present themselves, according to the
item of the original programme that one decides to shelve. It is then no surprise that different
Keynesian theories co-exist. They have all a lineage in Keynes’s programme and there is no
reason to argue that one particular departure is superior to the others.
Beyond doubt, the main difficulty standing in the way of the realisation of Keynes’s
programme is its first item, demonstrating involuntary unemployment in the individual
disequilibrium sense. This raises the last question that I wish to tackle in this paper  should
Keynesian economists continue to strive to demonstrate involuntary unemployment in its
strong meaning?
The  main  motivation  behind  Keynesian  economists’  attempt  to  introduce  involuntary
unemployment in economic theory is their belief that it is an important fact of life. For
example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985: 1217) write ‘To us, involuntary unemployment is a real
and important phenomenon with grave social consequences that needs to be explained and
understood’. This belief is shared by most Keynesian economists.
 They are convinced that,17
out there in the real world, something exists which deserves to be called involuntary
unemployment, and bears the connotations mentioned above, especially that people are
unemployed through no fault of their own.
 10 Hence their desire to introduce this concept into
the theoretical discourse.
What explains the difficulty of constructing a theory of involuntary unemployment? Is it, as
argued by Lucas, that the ‘thing’‘ to be explained doesn’t exist, or is it due to some deeply
embedded premise of economic theory? My own view tilts towards the latter. Economic
theory is concerned with parables. The premises upon which it is based have the advantage of
allowing tractable rigorous theorising, yet the price of this is that important facts of life are
excluded from the theoretical universe. Non-chosen outcomes is one of them. The underlying
reason lies in the trade technology and perfect information assumptions upon which both the
Walrasian (and neo-Walrasian) and the Marshallian (and neo-Marshallian) theories of value
are based. Put differently, as soon as the centralised market hypothesis is adopted, the
democratic character of the market becomes a compelling conclusion: no non-optimal
solution can be imposed upon any agent or, in other words, interactive equilibrium implies
individual equilibrium. The exclusion of non-chosen outcomes ensues.
In a brilliant and oft-quoted passage of the General Theory, Keynes wrote:
Obviously, however, if the classical theory is only applicable to the case of full
employment, it is fallacious to apply it to the problems of involuntary unemployment 
if there is such a thing (and who would deny it?). The classical theorists resemble
Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world who, discovering that in experience
straight lines apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the line for not keeping straight 
as the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which are occurring. Yet, in truth, there
is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-
Euclidean geometry (Keynes 1936: 16).
Let us accept that Keynes is right in his diagnosis. This still does not take us very far. The fact
that one may pray for the occurrence of a non-Euclidean geometry hardly suffices to bring it
about. And if it proves so difficult to construct, what should be done in the meantime? With
the exception of Clower and Leijonhufvud on the one hand, and post-Keynesians, on the
other, Keynesian economists can be seen as geometricians who have opted for continuing to
use traditional Euclidean geometry for want of a serviceable alternative.
Here  Euclidian  geometry  is  tantamount  to  economic  theory  without  involuntary
unemployment. However, the elimination of this concept would only affect the theoretical
sphere. Drawing conclusions from this sphere about the real world would be a mistake. That
                                                   
10  As  once  stated  by  Solow,  ‘I  believe  that  what  looks  like  involuntary  unemployment  is  involuntary
unemployment’ (1980: 3).18
is, one should not deny the existence of real world involuntary unemployment merely on the
grounds that there is no place for the concept of involuntary unemployment in the theoretical
discourse. As a counterpart, the fact that solid arguments can be put forward as to its real-
world existence is not a sufficient condition to give it theoretical legitimacy. Admittedly, this
position makes sense only if it is accepted  – as I believe it should be – that a sharp divide
must be drawn between the real world and the fictitious theoretical universe. Unfortunately,
the principle of such a separation is scarcely admitted either by Keynesians or by the new
classicists.  The  latter  have  not  hesitated  to  transpose  the  theoretical  non-existence  of
involuntary unemployment onto the real world. The flaw of Keynesians is that they have
over-stated their case: while their model only demonstrates either involuntary unemployment
in the narrow frustration meaning or underemployment, they behave as if they had succeeded
in giving an explanation of involuntary unemployment in its common-sense meaning.
Foregoing the involuntary unemployment claim may look like a high price to pay, since the
existence of mass unemployment, interpreted as having an important involuntary component,
was the real-world phenomenon that triggered the whole Keynesian enterprise. Yet would its
abandonment really be so dramatic? Several arguments suggest  that it might not be so.
First, as stated above, this theoretical abandonment should have no impact on assessments
made about reality, in so far as the principle of a separation between the two levels of
discourse is accepted.
Second, the reasons for its dismissal should be taken into account, i.e. the rationality
assumption and the centralised trade technology assumption. Both of these are defensible on
the grounds of tractability and the lack of better alternatives. Still, there is nothing to boast
about in their adoption. Their only justification is expediency. If involuntary unemployment is
deemed to be theoretically unacceptable only on such grounds, there is no reason to make a
fuss over its dismissal.
Third, the issue at stake is whether the demonstration of involuntary unemployment should
have priority over the other points on Keynes’s programme once it is admitted that they are on
a collision course. To Keynes, the concept of involuntary unemployment was instrumental in
the realisation of a larger cause, namely the denunciation of a system failure and the
vindication of state intervention in the economy. If this concept has been an object of
controversy, it is mainly because it was a metaphor for the wider judgement to be made on the
efficiency of a competitive market system, and of the opportunities for state intervention in it.
Wanting to defend the involuntary unemployment concept then amounts to taking a sceptical
stance on the virtues of laissez-faire, and to defending the view that outside interference in the
market can be beneficial. Similarly, opposition to involuntary unemployment would then stem
from support for full laissez-faire. This is the real issue in the dispute. But this debate does not
necessarily need the involuntary unemployment concept. Therefore, in the present state of19
economic theory one should not stick  too firmly to the view that involuntary unemployment
is the sine qua non of Keynesian theory.
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